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STEPPING INTO THE “WRONG” 
NEIGHBORHOOD: A CRITIQUE OF THE 
PEOPLE V. ALBILLAR’S EXPANSION OF 
CALIFORNIA PENAL CODE SECTION 
186.22(a) AND A CALL TO REEXAMINE THE 
TREATMENT OF GANG AFFILIATION 
SAMUEL DIPIETRO* 
Since 1988, the number of California criminal street gangs has 
increased from 600 to 6,442, an increase of roughly 973%.  This dramatic 
increase in gang participation occurred despite the California Legislature 
adopting increasingly harsher anti-gang laws.  One such law, adopted in 
1988, is the Street Terrorism and Enforcement Prevention Act (STEP Act), 
which contains a substantive offense for being a member of a criminal street 
gang and an enhancement offense for committing gang-related crimes.  In 
2010, the California Supreme Court, in the case of People v. Albillar, 
interpreted Section 186.22(a) of the STEP Act to apply to any felonious 
criminal conduct by gang members instead of solely gang-related felonious 
conduct.  The court’s holding in Albillar essentially allows a defendant who 
is affiliated with a criminal street gang to receive an additional sentence for 
the commission of any felonious crime regardless of whether the crime had 
any relationship to the defendant’s gang membership.  This Comment argues 
that such an application of Section 186.22(a) runs afoul of the Supreme 
Court’s holding in Robinson v. California, where the Court held that 
punishing an addict for his status of being addicted to drugs amounted to 
cruel and unusual punishment.  While Section 186.22(a) does require a 
felonious act unlike the statute in Robinson, this Comment examines the 
Supreme Court’s holdings regarding the constitutionality of hate crime 
enhancements and concludes that the California Supreme Court’s holding in 
 
 * I would like to thank Professor Leonard Rubinowitz, Emelia Carroll, and Reilly Frye for 
their guidance and editorial support throughout this Comment’s development process. Also, I 
would like to thank my beautiful wife, Cheyenne DiPietro, whose interest in criminal law 
inspired me to write about this topic. 
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Albillar exceeds constitutional bounds.  This Comment concludes by 
examining the policy rationale behind the Robinson holding and applying 
that rationale to gang membership, suggesting that treatment, as opposed to 
imprisonment, might be the proper solution to California’s criminal street 
gang problem. 
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INTRODUCTION 
What do we know to be true about gang violence? We know we will fail if we fixate 
on the symptoms and not address what undergirds it.1 
Imagine a world where a society has determined that fraternities are 
against social policy.  However, a Constitution prevents this society from 
punishing mere fraternity membership, so the society creates a law that 
increases the punishment for active fraternity members who commit crimes 
by up to three years.  By including an underlying criminal offense, this 
society deems that the law does not punish being a member of a fraternity, 
but only fraternity members who commit crimes.  But this additional 
sentence only applies to fraternity members when they commit a crime; if a 
non-fraternity member committed the same crime, they would not receive an 
additional sentence.  Since it is difficult to determine who is a fraternity 
member, courts in this world allow fraternity experts to testify as to whether 
a defendant is a member of or associated with a fraternity.  Furthermore, 
prosecutors can present evidence of a defendant’s fraternity association, such 
as a defendant’s family history, fraternity membership, the community where 
a defendant lives, and even the type of clothes that a defendant wears.  In the 
context of fraternity membership, such a world might seem absurd.  But this 
world is very real in the context of gang membership and gang affiliation in 
California under the Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention Act 
(STEP Act), codified in Section 186.22 of the California Penal Code. 
In the past decade, numerous journal articles have critiqued and often 
criticized the STEP Act; however, the Act has fallen out of the jurisprudential 
spotlight as of late.  This is despite several California Supreme Court 
decisions that have expanded the applicability of the Act to encompass more 
and more criminal activities.  In addition, in the past few years, other state 
courts have begun to question the constitutionality of their gang enhancement 
provisions when examining similar gang enhancement statutes.2  Therefore, 
it is time that the STEP Act is reexamined. 
 
 1 Gregory J. Boyle, A Lethal Absence of Hope, L.A. TIMES, (Oct. 15, 2002), http://articl
es.latimes.com/2002/oct/15/opinion/oe-boyle15 [https://perma.cc/S6W4-VE4T]. 
 2 See, e.g., State v. Turner, No. E201600651CCAR3CDE2016-00651-CCA-R3-CD, 2017 
WL 1830106 *19 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 5, 2017) (holding Tennessee’s gang enhancement 
statute unconstitutional); Rodriguez v. State, 671 S.E.2d 497, 503 (Ga. 2009) (holding 
Georgia’s gang enhancement statute constitutional). 
626 DIPIETRO [Vol. 110 
This Comment examines the modern-day STEP Act, discusses the 
impact of People v. Albillar’s interpretation of Section 186.22(a) to include 
non-gang-related felonies, and argues that Section 186.22(a) has exceeded 
Constitutional limits in light of the Supreme Court’s decisions in Robinson 
v. California and Powell v. Texas.  This Comment then proceeds to argue 
that, as a matter of public policy, gang affiliation—like drug addiction—is 
better treated through rehabilitation programs as opposed to imprisonment.  
Part I of this Comment summarizes the history of the STEP Act and 
introduces Sections 186.22(a) and 186.22(b).  Part II introduces and 
discusses the importance of People v. Albillar’s expansion of Section 
186.22(a) to include non-gang-related felonious offenses.  Part III introduces 
the foundational requirements of culpability and examines the application of 
these requirements in the Supreme Court cases Robinson v. California and 
Powell v. Texas.  Part IV then applies Robinson and Powell to Section 
186.22(a), concluding that Section 186.22(a), post-Albillar, is 
unconstitutional.  Part V makes a policy related argument that, like drug 
addiction, gang affiliation should be treated with rehabilitation rather than 
punished with imprisonment. 
I. THE STEP ACT & SECTION 186.22 
A. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE STEP ACT 
Anti-gang legislation increases the ability of prosecutors to prosecute 
gang activities.  Examples of anti-gang legislation are statutes that 
criminalize gang recruitment and gang solicitation.3  Anti-gang legislation is 
oftentimes justified based on the notion that gangs protect their associates 
and, because many gang crimes are committed in groups, it is more difficult 
for law enforcement to curb gang crime absent laws that specifically target 
gang members.4  This justification is what led California to become the first 
state to adopt anti-gang legislation through the adoption of the STEP Act in 
1988.5 
The preamble to the STEP Act (the Act) provides that the Act was 
enacted to address the nearly 600 criminal street gangs operating in 
California.6  The Act attempted to curb gang membership by making it a 
criminal offense to engage in certain gang activities.7  Almost immediately 
 
 3 Beth Bjerregaard, The Constitutionality of Anti-Gang Legislation, 21 CAMPBELL L. REV. 
31, 32 (1998). 
 4 People v. Albillar, 244 P.3d 1062, 1068 (Cal. 2010). 
 5 Id. 
 6 See Cal. Penal Code § 186.21 (West 2012). 
 7 See Bjerregaard supra note 3, at 32. 
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after enactment, the Act was in the public spotlight.8  Dubbed “Baby RICO,” 
enforcement of the Act began with police officers asking suspected gang 
members to sign “special-delivery notices” that served to notify suspected 
gang members of the new law; these were considered admissible as evidence 
of gang membership in court.9  Enforcement of the Act immediately became 
controversial in 1989 when police, relying on the Act, arrested a mother for 
allegedly supporting her son’s gang involvement.10 Specifically, the mother 
was arrested for failing to supervise her son and for creating an environment 
that encouraged his gang involvement.11  While the mother’s case was 
ultimately dismissed after she successfully completed a parenting program, 
such arguably broad applications of the Act led the American Civil Liberties 
Union of Southern California (ACLU) to file suit on the grounds that the Act 
was unconstitutionally vague.12 The ACLU’s lawsuit was successful, and 
within the first two years of the Act taking effect, the provision of the Act 
that was used to prosecute the mother was deemed unconstitutional for failing 
 
 8 See Mike Reilly, Law to Check Gang Violence Sparks Debate, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, 
Oct. 13, 1990, at 13. 
 9 Michele Fuetsch, New Weapon in Gang Wars: Compton Police Serve Written Notice of 
Street Terrorism Act, L.A. TIMES (June 1, 1989), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-
1989-06-01-hl-1288-story.html [https://perma.cc/9WHT-SHBW]; see also Mike Ward, 
Pasadena Police Plan Crackdown on Gangs: Department Assigns More Officers and Is Ready 
to Prosecute Under State Law on Street Terrorists, L.A. TIMES (May 21, 1989), https://
www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1989-05-21-ga-655-story.html [https://perma.cc/9QHR-
HEX4] (the notice that police attempted to have suspected gang members sign provided in 
part “IRA REINER DISTRICT ATTORNEY . . . IN RE: THE MATTER OF GANG TO: 
MEMBERS OF THE GANG AND, YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED that the GANG is a 
criminal street gang engaging in a pattern of criminal street gang activity within the meaning 
of Penal Code Section 186.22 . . . .YOU ARE FOR THIS REASON FURTHER NOTIFIED 
THAT ACTIVE PARTICIPATION IN A CRIMINAL STREET GANG COULD SUBJECT 
YOU TO IMPRISONMENT IN THE STATE PRISON FOR A PERIOD OF UP TO THREE 
YEARS PURSUANT TO THE STREET TERRORISM ENFORCEMENT ACT OF 1988”). 
 10 See Editorial, Holding Parents Responsible for Teens, CHI TRIBUNE (May 9, 1989), 
https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-1989-05-09-8904110259-story.html [https://
perma.cc/D65E-7QA6] (claiming that the first use of the STEP Act to arrest an alleged gang 
member’s mother “reflects widespread frustration with teenage crime and drug dealing and is 
intended to serve notice to parents that they cannot abandon their responsibilities”); see also 
Bruce Buursma, When Mom’s Just One of the Gang, L.A. Gets Tough, CHI. TRIBUNE (May 7, 
1989), https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-1989-05-07-8904100543-story.html 
[https://perma.cc/V5D7-SZ9G]. 
 11 See Buursma, supra note 10. 
 12 Associated Press, Appeals Court Voids ‘Gang Mom’ Law, L.A. TIMES, (Dec. 22, 1991, 
12:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1991-12-22-mn-1615-story.html [http
s://perma.cc/RJ65-XB6R]; Paul Lieberman & Elizabeth J. Mann, Anti-Gang Law Hit in ACLU 
Suit: Measure That Holds Parents Responsible Called Unfair to Poor, L.A. TIMES, (July 21, 
1989), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1989-07-21-me-4332-story.html [https://pe
rma.cc/7F34-NC6Q]. 
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to define “reasonable parenting.”13  Since then various other provisions of 
the Act have also been challenged on constitutional grounds.14  The Act’s 
most commonly challenged sections are Section 186.22(a) and 186.22(b). 
B. SECTION 186.22: A SUBSTANTIVE CRIME AND A CRIMINAL 
ENHANCEMENT 
Section 186.22 of the Act contains both a substantive offense and a 
sentencing enhancement; Section 186.22(a) criminalizes actively 
participating in a criminal street gang and Section 186.22(b) enhances a 
sentence for committing crimes that benefit or promote a criminal street 
gang.15  While these sections are distinct in the sense that they can be 
prosecuted separately, they can also be prosecuted simultaneously.16  The 
ability to prosecute these offenses simultaneously can dramatically increase 
the minimum sentence for most felonies.  For example, while a conviction 
for witness intimidation in California generally carries a maximum sentence 
of three years, the application of Section 186.22 can increase the sentence to 
life imprisonment.17  This is due to any felonious offense committed under 
Section 186.22(a) or 186.22(b) counting towards California’s “three-strike” 
law which increases the sentences for habitual offenders. Thus, a defendant 
could receive two strikes in the same complaint if he is convicted of violating 
both Section 186.22(a) and 186.22(b).18 
While subtle, the distinction between a substantive offense and an 
enhancement offense is important.  A substantive offense is “[a] crime that 
is complete in itself and is not dependent on another crime for one of its 
elements.”19  Unlike a substantive offense, an enhancement offense is “[a]n 
offense that has a greater degree of severity than the normal offense of the 
 
 13 See Associated Press, supra note 12. 
 14 See, e.g., In re Alberto R., 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 348, 357 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (holding gang 
enhancement provision did not violate the Equal Protection Clause’s prohibition on 
vagueness); People v. Gamez, 286 Cal. Rptr. 894, 902 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that the 
gang enhancement provision did not violate defendant’s First Amendment rights). 
 15 Wes Reber Porter, Threaten Sentencing Enhancement, Coerce Plea, (Wash, Rinse,) 
Repeat: A Cause of Wrongful Conviction by Guilty Plea, 3 TEX. A&M L. REV. 261, 295 
(2015). 
 16 See generally People v. Albillar, 244 P.3d 1062, 1064 (Cal. 2010) (affirming both the 
substantive offense under Section 186.22(a) and the enhancement offense under Section 
186.22(b)). 
 17 See Martin Baker, Stuck in the Thicket: Struggling with Interpretation and Application 
of California’s Anti-Gang STEP Act, 11 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 101, 105 (2006). 
 18 Id. 
 19 See Offense, Crime, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
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same kind, [] because of aggravating circumstances.”20  An illustrative 
example, not related to the Act, would be robbing a store with a weapon.  
Robbing a store would be a substantive offense in and of itself, whereas the 
use of a weapon to rob a store would be an enhancement offense; it carries a 
greater degree of severity than just robbing a store but cannot exist 
independently from robbing the store. 
Despite the distinction between an enhancement and substantive 
offense, both offenses require the prosecutor charging a defendant under the 
Act to prove the existence of a criminal street gang.  Section 186.22(f) defines 
a criminal street gang as “any ongoing organization . . . of three or more 
persons . . . having as one of its primary activities the commission of one or 
more of the criminal acts enumerated [in Subsection (e)].”21  Subsection 
186.22(e) provides a laundry list of criminal activities that qualify as gang 
activities including: assault, unlawful possession of a firearm, sale and 
manufacture of controlled substances, fraud, theft, rape, and vandalism.22 
The substantive offense requires that the prosecutor prove the following 
elements: the defendant was an active participant in a criminal street gang, 
the defendant knew that the gang’s members engage in a pattern of criminal 
activity, and the defendant willfully assisted in any “felonious criminal 
conduct by [gang] members.”23  Common proof of active participation in a 
street gang is: the existence of gang tattoos or gang paraphernalia, admission 
by the defendant to being an active participant in a criminal street gang, 
presence with known gang members at the time of arrest, witness testimony 
establishing the defendant’s affiliation with a gang, and circumstantial 
evidence indicating active participation, such as close association between 
the defendant and gang members.24  However, since there is not a widely 
accepted definition for what being a “gang member” is, there is not a 
requirement that a defendant actually be a member of the gang.  Instead, 
affiliation with a gang, as evidenced by the aforementioned common proof 
of active participation, is deemed adequate to show active participation in a 
gang.  In addition to the above, the enhancement offense requires that the 
prosecutor prove the defendant committed a felony for the benefit of a 
criminal street gang and with the intent to further the gang’s criminal 
 
 20 Id. 
 21 Formerly Incarcerated Reenter Society Transformed Safely Transitioning Every Person 
(FIRST STEP) Act, 18 U.S.C. § 186.22(f) (2018). 
 22 Id. at § 186.22(e). 
 23 People v. Lamas, 169 P.3d 102, 106 (Cal. 2007). 
 24 J. Franklin Sigal, Out of Step: When the California Street Terrorism Enforcement and 
Prevention Act Stumbles into Penal Code Limits, 38 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 1, 32 (2007). 
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conduct.25  Prosecutors often prove intent to further the gang’s criminal 
conduct by using an expert witness, which is someone with general 
knowledge of criminal street gangs based on training, education, or 
experience, and who can thus provide the jury with testimony in regards to 
whether the defendant is a member of a criminal street gang.26 
Section II and Section IV of this Comment will focus on the “any 
felonious criminal conduct by [gang] members” element in Section 
186.22(a).  Originally, “any felonious criminal conduct” was interpreted to 
mean felonious conduct that was gang-related.27  The significance of this was 
that in order for the defendant to be criminally liable, the prosecutor would 
have to prove that the defendant was “an aider and abettor to any specific 
crime committed by a member or members of a criminal street gang.”28  
Thus, if a gang member committed a felony unrelated to his or her gang 
membership, Section 186.22(a) would be inapplicable when prosecuting the 
gang member for the felonious crime.  But in 2010, People v. Albillar, as 
discussed in the next section, extended the application of Section 186.22(a) 
to felonious crimes committed by gang members that were unrelated to their 
gang membership. 
II. THE PEOPLE V. ALBILLAR AND SECTION 186.22(A)’S 
EXPANSION TO INCLUDE NON-GANG-RELATED CRIMES 
A. PEOPLE V. ALBILLAR: BACKGROUND, CRIMES, AND 
CONVICTIONS 
In December 2004, John Madrigal, Albert Albillar and Alex Albillar 
raped fifteen-year-old Amanda M.29  In addition to numerous sex offenses, 
all three were charged with violating Section 186.22(a) and Section 
 
 25 § 186.22(b). 
 26 People v. Blessett, 232 Cal. Rptr. 3d 164, 198 (Ct. App. 2018) as modified on denial of 
reh’g (May 24, 2018). The Author would like to note that an Editor, when reviewing this 
Article, made the excellent observation that California Rule 720 requires an expert witness to 
have “special knowledge” as opposed to merely “general knowledge.” Without going into too 
much depth, California courts have allowed expert testimony concerning an expert’s “general 
knowledge;” for an excellent analysis of what an expert can and cannot testify to see People 
v. Sanchez, 63 Cal. 4th 665, 676 (2016) (“[K]nowledge in a specialized area is what 
differentiates the expert from a lay witness . . . [a]s such, an expert’s testimony concerning his 
general knowledge, even if technically hearsay, has not been subject to exclusion on hearsay 
grounds.”). 
 27 People v. Ngoun, 105 Cal. Rptr. 2d 837, 839 (Cal. 2001). 
 28 People v. Green, 278 Cal. Rptr. 140, 148 (Ct. App. 1991). 
 29 People v. Albillar, 244 P.3d 1062, 1065 (Cal. 2010). 
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186.22(b).30  While all three admitted to being members of the Southside 
Chiques street gang, a gang known for committing a wide assortment of 
crimes in the Oxnard, California area, they claimed that the rape was not 
gang-related because they did not commit the rape on behalf of, or to the 
benefit of, the Southside Chiques gang.31 
At trial, Oxnard Police Detective Neail Holland testified as an expert 
witness.32  Holland testified that members of the Southside Chiques gang 
obtain status in the gang through the commission of crimes.33  Holland 
further testified that the defendants’ actions were likely for the benefit of the 
Southside Chiques gang because the viciousness of the crime would increase 
the gang’s notorious reputation.34  But Holland also acknowledged that 
Hispanic gangs, like the Southside Chiques, punish rape, and “[i]f a gang 
member were convicted of rape, he would ‘lose status within the gang.’”35  
Weighing Holland’s somewhat conflicting testimony, the jury convicted the 
three defendants of violating Section 186.22(a) and Section 186.22(b) along 
with numerous other sex crimes.36 
B. SUBSEQUENT APPEAL AND THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT 
HOLDING 
As previously discussed, prior to People v. Albillar, it was commonly 
understood that Section 186.22(a) was only applicable to gang-related 
conduct.37  Based on this understanding, the defendants appealed the Section 
186.22(a) conviction on the grounds that Section 186.22(a) includes an 
“implied requirement that the felonious criminal conduct be gang related” 
and, as evidenced by Holland’s testimony, the Southside Chiques gang 
opposed rape.38  Reviewing the defendants’ appeal, the California Supreme 
Court began by examining the plain language of Section 186.22(a).  The 
court noted that the text of Section 186.22(a) states any felonious conduct 
rather than just gang-related felonious conduct and thus, by the statute’s 
plain language, it “targets felonious criminal conduct, not [solely] felonious 
 
 30 Id. at 1064. 
 31 Id. at 1066. 
 32 Id. 
 33 Id. 
 34 Id. at 1067. 
 35 People v. Albillar, 76 Cal. Rptr. 3d 383, 390 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008), review granted and 
opinion superseded, 190 P.3d 534 (Cal. 2008), and aff’d, 244 P.3d 1062 (2010). 
 36 Albillar, 244 P.3d at 1065. 
 37 See People v. Ngoun, 105 Cal. Rptr. 2d 837 (2001). 
 38 Albillar, 244 P.3d at 1067. 
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gang-related conduct.”39  The court justified its interpretation by explaining 
that crimes committed by gang members in conjunction with one another 
pose dangers to the public not present in crimes committed by persons with 
no gang affiliations.40  For example, witnesses might be less likely to testify 
against a gang member knowing that they might face retaliation from the 
gang. 
The court noted that the gravamen of Section 186.22(a) is the active 
participation requirement rather than whether the underlying crime is gang-
related.41  The defendants challenged this interpretation as a violation of 
Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961), which held in part that criminal 
liability cannot be based on mere membership.42  The California Supreme 
Court rejected this challenge by distinguishing Scales from the present case.  
The court held that while Scales barred guilt based solely on membership, 
Scales did not bar guilt based on active membership—membership that is 
more than nominal or passive.43 
The court, relying on its prior decision in the People v. Castenada, 3 
P.3d 278 (Cal. 2000), held that the active participation requirement of Section 
186.22(a) allows the statute to withstand the Scales requirements.44  The 
defendants called attention to the Castenada court’s dicta that “section 
186.22(a) would pass constitutional muster only if it were to link a 
defendant’s criminal liability to a separate felony offense committed by street 
 
 39 Id. at 1068. 
 40 Id. 
 41 Id. 
 42 Id.; see Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 227 (1961) (discussing that “membership, 
even when accompanied by the elements of knowledge and specific intent, affords an 
insufficient quantum of participation in the organization’s alleged criminal activity, that is, an 
insufficiently significant form of aid and encouragement to permit the imposition of criminal 
sanctions on that basis”). 
 43 Albillar, 244 P. 3d at 1069. (“The high court [United States Supreme Court] construed 
the statute to require active membership and, as so construed, upheld it despite the absence of 
any element requiring a specific act of criminality, placing active membership in the same 
category as criminal conspiracy and complicity—” particular legal concepts manifesting the 
more general principle that society, having the power to punish dangerous behavior, cannot 
be powerless against those who work to bring about that behavior.”) (internal citations 
omitted); see also infra Section I.B (discussing the evidence commonly used to show active 
participation. Since the question of whether the defendant was an “active participant” is a 
question of fact there is not a “bright line” definition, rather the trier of fact must weigh the 
evidence and determine whether they believe the defendant to be an active participant in the 
gang.). 
 44 Albillar, 244 P. 3d at 1070; see also People v. Castenada, 3 P.3d 278 (Cal. 2000) 
(holding that the “actively participates” requirement of Section 186.22(a) was not 
unconstitutionally vague and that the distinction between active and nominal participation was 
well understood in common parlance). 
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gang members in furtherance of the gang.”45  The Castenada court’s rationale 
was that the underlying felonious criminal conduct must be related to the 
defendant’s gang membership in order to prove active participation as 
opposed to participation that was merely nominal or passive.46  The 
Castenada court’s concern was that, absent a gang-related underlying felony, 
Section 186.22(a) would punish mere gang association and thus render the 
statute unconstitutional.47 
The Albillar court responded that in Castenada, they were not asked to 
address whether the underlying offense must be gang-related; therefore, the 
defendants’ reliance on Castenada was misplaced.48  The court examined the 
legislative history of Section 186.22(a) and noted that the original bill read, 
“[a]ny person who actively conducts or participates, directly or indirectly, in 
any gang, with the specific intent to promote or further any of its criminal 
gang-related activity or to assist in continuing its pattern of criminal gang-
related activity.”49  Since the amended bill omitted the italicized portions of 
the proposed bill, the court concluded that the legislature intended Section 
186.22(a) to apply to any felonious conduct.50 
The court further justified this interpretation of the statute by noting that 
gang members tend to protect each other regardless of whether the conduct 
was gang-related, and thus, gang membership poses unique “dangers to the 
public and difficulties for law enforcement not generally present when a 
crime is committed by someone with no gang affiliation.”51  Addressing the 
Castenada court’s concern that applying Section 186.22(a) to non-gang-
related crimes might lead to the punishment of passive membership, the 
Albillar court held that proof of active participation, including guilty 
knowledge, would be enough to prevent Section 186.22(a) from penalizing 
the nominal or passive gang member.52  Having considered the argument, the 
court concluded that felonious conduct in Section 186.22(a) applies to all 
felonious conduct regardless of whether it is gang -related.53 
 
 45 See Albillar, 244 P. 3d at 1070. 
 46 See Castenada, 3 P.3d at 285. 
 47 Id. 
 48 Albillar, 244 P. 3d at 1068. 
 49 Id. at 1068. 
 50 Id. at 1068–69. 
 51 Id. at 1068. 
 52 Id. at 1067–68. 
 53 Id. at 1068–69. 
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C. SIGNIFICANCE OF HOLDING AND POST-ALBILLAR DECISIONS 
The Albillar holding amounts to a significant departure from other 
states’ interpretation of their gang affiliation statutes to require that the 
underlying crime be gang-related.54  States that require a nexus between gang 
membership and the underlying felonious crime have concluded that absent 
a nexus, a gang enhancement would inherently punish mere gang 
membership.55  Deviating from this interpretation, post-Albillar California 
cases have subjected California defendants to substantive gang sentences for 
crimes such as carjacking, robbery, drug possession, and felony possession 
of a firearm even when the crimes had no benefit to a criminal street gang.56  
In 2012, the California Supreme Court, seemingly attempting to narrow the 
scope of Section 186.22(a) post-Albillar, held that while Section 186.22(a) 
can apply to non-gang-related felonious conduct, the felonious conduct must 
be committed by two or more persons.57  Logically, this requirement would 
seem to suggest that there exists a link between the underlying felonious 
conduct and the gang in the sense that two or more gang affiliates acting in 
concert to commit a crime would seem inherently gang -related.  But the 
court specifically reiterated that the underlying crime need not be gang-
related.58  Furthermore, as shown in Section IV, this requirement can easily 
be manipulated, and the issue of the substantive gang offense applying to 
non-gang-related conduct still remains.59  The next sections will introduce 
Robinson v. California and Powell v. Texas, two Supreme Court cases that 
discuss the punishment of status, and will serve as the baseline to determine 
whether Section 186.22 is constitutional. 
 
 54 See State v. Turner, No. E2016-00651-CCA-R3-CD, 2017 WL 1830106 at *19 (Tenn. 
Crim. App. May 5, 2017) (“[T]he statutory provision offends the principle of due process 
because it fails to tie membership in a gang to the offense at issue.”); see also Rushing v. 
Virginia, 726 S.E.2d 333, 338 (Va. 2012) (“A defendant charged with gang 
participation . . . may be convicted upon a showing that he participated in a gang-related 
crime.”); State v. State v. Caldwell, 815 N.W.2d 512, 517 (Minn. Ct. App. 2012) (“The state 
here had to prove that Caldwell shot P.B. intending to benefit the Crips . . . .”). 
 55 See Turner, 2017 WL 1830106, at *17. 
 56 See, e.g., Ruiz v. Gipson, No. 1:14-cv-00224-LJO-JLT (HC),114CV00224LJOJLTHC, 
2017 WL 1064650, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2017); Corcoles v. Lewis, No. SACV 11-0648-
JSL (RNB), 2013 WL 1401369, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 16, 2013). 
 57 See People v. Rodriguez, 290 P.3d 1143, 1153 (Cal. 2012). 
 58 Id. 
 59 See People v. Lopez, No. A133997, 2013 WL 4784760, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 9, 
2013) (affirming defendant’s Section 186.22(a) conviction for unlawful firearm possession at 
a home where he had lived with his sister who was also associated with the gang. The section 
186.22(b) was also affirmed because possessing a gun was deemed to benefit a street gang.). 
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III. ROBINSON V. CALIFORNIA & POWELL V. TEXAS: WHEN DOES 
PUNISHING A STATUS GO TOO FAR? 
A. THE REQUIREMENTS OF CULPABILITY: ACTUS REUS AND 
MENS REA 
Prior to discussing Robinson v. California and Powell v. Texas, it is 
worthwhile to provide a brief background on the requirements of culpability 
underlying the Robinson Court’s decision.  Two Latin terms to which first-
year law students quickly become accustomed in their criminal law course 
are “mens rea” and “actus reus.”  Actus reus requires that liability be attached 
to a certain action, and mens rea refers to the culpable state of mind that must 
accompany the action for a criminal sentence to be imposed.60  Taken 
together, both terms establish the bedrock for imposing criminal liability. 
To better illustrate the concepts of actus reus and mens rea, consider the 
following example.  A defendant is charged with vandalism due to crashing 
through a store window.  The actus reus would be crashing through the store 
window and the mens rea would be the defendant’s intent to crash through 
the window or his negligence in doing so.  But had the defendant been hit by 
a car that propelled him into the window, then there would be no actus reus 
on the part of the defendant because there was not a volitional act by the 
defendant.  Likewise, mens rea would be absent in the case where the 
defendant was hit by a car because the defendant had no intent to be propelled 
into the window and the defendant’s negligent actions did not cause the crash.  
In both cases, the defendant crashed through the window, but in the second 
case, where the defendant was hit by a car, the defendant would not be liable 
due to the absence of mens rea and actus reus. 
The imposition of both an actus reus and a mens rea requirement aligns 
with the higher purposes of criminal law: to deter, to punish, and to 
rehabilitate.  The purpose of deterrence is to impose a punishment that will 
both prevent the guilty person from committing the offense in the future and 
prevent others in the community from committing the offense.61  For 
example—returning to the defendant hit by a car causing the crash through 
the window—the law would not punish the defendant because doing so 
would have no deterrent effect; it was not the defendant’s fault that the crash 
occurred.  The retributive purpose of criminal law has the goal of punishing 
offenders to make them realize the moral depravity of their actions.62  
 
 60 See MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 2.01, 2.02 (1962). 
 61 John E. Witte, Jr. & Thomas C. Arthur, The Three Uses of the Law: A Protestant Source 
of the Purposes of Criminal Punishment?, 10 J.L. & RELIGION 433, 452 (1993). 
 62 Id. at 455. 
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Likewise, the defendant who is struck by a car causing the defendant to crash 
through the window did not commit a morally reprehensible action and thus 
punishment would not serve a retributive effect. 
The final purpose of criminal law is rehabilitative. Rehabilitation has 
the goal of integrating an offender back into society and restoring the rule of 
law to the community.63  In the case of a defendant who purposefully crashed 
into a store window and was not hit by another car, the rehabilitative goal 
would be to integrate the defendant back into society so that the defendant 
does not break more windows in the future.  Whereas in the case where the 
defendant was hit by a car, there would be no rehabilitative effect because it 
is unlikely that the defendant could control being hit by a car in the future.  
The distinction between what is appropriate to punish and what is not 
appropriate to punish underlies the Supreme Court’s decisions in Robinson 
v. California and Powell v. Texas. 
B. CALIFORNIA’S BAN ON DRUG ADDICTION AND THE SUPREME 
COURT IN ROBINSON 
In the 1962 case, Robinson v. California, the United States Supreme 
Court examined a California law that subjected drug addicts to criminal 
prosecution for their status drug addicts.  The law provided that “[n]o person 
shall use, or be under the influence of, or be addicted to the use of narcotics” 
and imposed a sentence from ninety days to a year if convicted.64  Under this 
statute, Lawrence Robinson was arrested when an officer noticed what he 
suspected to be needle marks on Robinson’s arm.65  After being convicted of 
being a drug addict, Robinson appealed on the grounds that the statute 
violated his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights66, and the United 
States Supreme Court granted certiorari.67  Justice Stewart, writing for the 
majority, concluded that the law violated the Eighth Amendment’s ban on 
cruel and unusual punishment.68 
 
 63 Id. at 456. 
 64 Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 661–62 n.1 (1962). 
 65 Id. at 661. 
 66 See Appellant’s Opening Brief at 11, 29, Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) 
(No. 554). The Eighth Amendment bars the infliction of cruel and unusual punishments. See, 
e.g., Richard Visek, Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 74 GEO. L.J. 875 (1986) (providing more 
insight into what constitutes a “cruel and unusual” punishment); see also infra Section V.A. 
The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees due process and provides that “[n]o state shall make 
or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United 
States.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 2. 
 67 See Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 66, at 11; Robinson, 370 U.S. at 661. 
 68 Id. at 667. 
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The Court first held that the California drug addiction statute lacked an 
actus reus requirement because, instead of punishing a defendant for an 
action related to drug use, the statute punished a defendant for the “status of 
narcotic addiction.”69  The Court noted that the statute created an offense by 
which the defendant would be continually guilty regardless of whether he or 
she had actually possessed or used drugs in the State of California.70  The 
notion of continuous guilt was embedded in the common proof submitted to 
sustain a conviction of drug addiction: red eyes, pupil size, scars, and a 
history of narcotics use.71  In fact, the defendant in Robinson was convicted 
primarily based on the discolorations and scabs on his arms and the testimony 
of two officers familiar with the signs of drug addiction.72  Justice Stewart, 
writing for the majority, held that this statute was unconstitutional because it 
“[made] the ‘status’ of narcotic addiction a criminal offense, for which the 
offender may be prosecuted ‘at any time before he reforms.’”73  Justice 
Harlan, concurring, further noted that punishment for the bare desire to 
commit a criminal act is unconstitutional because a defendant cannot control 
his or her bare desires.74 
In addition to finding the lack of an actus reus, the Robinson Court 
struck down the California addiction statute for punishing a disease.75  The 
notion that punishing a disease is unconstitutional would seem to lend itself 
to the concept of mens rea because punishing a disease does not punish a 
guilty intention—no one intends to be an addict.  This argument is evidenced 
in Justice Douglas’s concurring opinion.  Justice Douglas began with a 
discussion of the development of society’s treatment of the mentally ill, from 
punishment to rehabilitative.76  He attributed this transition to the recognition 
of insanity as a disease and the fact that punishing the insane would not serve 
to deter the insane from committing crimes because the insane cannot change 
the fact that they are insane—insanity is not purposeful.77  Justice Douglas 
 
 69 Id. at 666; see also supra Section III.A (discussing the concept of actus reus). 
 70 Robinson, 370 U.S. at 666. 
 71 See Edwin C. Conrad, The Admissibility of the Nalline Test as Evidence of the Presence 
of Narcotics, 50 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 187, 188 (1959). 
 72 Robinson, 370 U.S at 661–63. 
 73 Id. at 666. 
 74 Id. at 678. 
 75 Id. at 667. 
 76 Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 668–69 (1962) (Douglas, J., concurring). 
 77 See id. at 668 (“Nothing can more strongly illustrate the popular ignorance respecting 
insanity than the proposition, equally objectionable in its humanity and its logic, that the 
insane should be punished for criminal acts, in order to deter other insane persons from doing 
the same thing.” (quoting TREATISE ON THE MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE OF INSANITY 56 (5th ed. 
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extended this argument to a drug addict, who, through taking drugs, becomes 
dependent upon them and cannot control being an addicted to them.78  Justice 
Douglas noted that convicting an addict was not cruel and unusual 
punishment, but rather that convicting an addict of a crime which serves not 
to cure but to penalize was cruel and unusual punishment.79 
Analogizing to the breaking the window illustration in Section III.A, 
convicting a drug addict for being addicted to drugs is akin to convicting 
someone for being hit by a car and breaking a window.  A drug addict cannot 
control his or her bare desires just as a person cannot control if they break a 
window after being hit by a car on the sidewalk.  In both cases, punishment 
would lack a rehabilitative or a deterrent effect because both the actus reus 
and the mens rea would be outside of the defendant’s control.  Thus, 
Robinson set two precedents, the foremost being that it is unconstitutional to 
punish a status and the second being that convicting an addict for his or her 
illness amounts to cruel and unusual punishment. 
C. POWELL V. TEXAS: DEFINING THE LIMITS OF THE ROBINSON 
DOCTRINE 
Four years after the Court’s decision in Robinson, the Supreme Court 
was asked to decide whether to extend the Robinson doctrine to public 
intoxication and alcoholism.  Leroy Powell was convicted in the State of 
Texas for being intoxicated in public.  The law that Powell violated provided 
that “[w]hoever shall get drunk or be found in a state of intoxication in any 
public place, or at any private house except his own, shall be fined not 
exceeding one hundred dollars.”80  On appeal to the Supreme Court, Powell 
argued that his conviction should be overturned due to Robinson’s 
prohibition of punishing a status because, like drug addiction, alcoholism is 
a disease.81 
Addressing the question of whether the Texas law punished a status, the 
Court held that the law did not prohibit the defendant from being an 
 
1871))). Id. The Author notes that the modern-day trend is to classify individuals as suffering 
from “mental illness” as opposed to labeling them as “insane.” The Author has chosen to retain 
the use of the word “insane” to preserve authenticity of the language used by Justice Douglas. 
 78 See id. at 673 (“But we do know that there is ‘a hard core’ of ‘chronic and incurable 
drug addicts who, in reality, have lost their power of self-control.’” (quoting S. REP. NO. 84-
2033, at 8 (1956)). 
 79 Id. at 676. 
 80 Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 517 (1968) (quoting TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 477 (West 
1954)). 
 81 Id. at 521. 
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alcoholic, but rather punished the defendant’s behavior in public.  The 
majority noted: 
The State of Texas thus has not sought to punish a mere status, as California did in 
Robinson; nor has it attempted to regulate appellant’s behavior in the privacy of his 
own home. Rather, it has imposed upon appellant a criminal sanction for public 
behavior which may create substantial health and safety hazards, both for appellant and 
for members of the general public, and which offends the moral and esthetic 
sensibilities of a large segment of the community.82 
The Court clarified that Robinson did not stand for the proposition that 
a person cannot be convicted for a status, but rather for the proposition that 
to punish a status requires a criminal act, an actus reus.83  Justice White 
clarified what the Court meant by this in his concurring opinion.  Powell was 
not convicted for being an alcoholic, but rather for being inebriated in a 
public place.  While subtle, this distinction is vital to reconcile Robinson with 
Powell.  In Robinson, the Court examined addiction, which was “remote in 
time from the application of the criminal sanctions contemplated . . . [and] 
relatively permanent in duration.”84  Public intoxication, unlike addiction, “is 
not far removed in time from the acts of ‘getting’ drunk and ‘going’ into 
public, and it is not necessarily a state of any great duration.”85  Thus Justice 
White explained that the question to ask when determining whether a law 
targets a status, as defined by Robinson, is “whether volitional acts brought 
about the ‘condition’ and whether those acts are sufficiently proximate to the 
‘condition’ for it to be permissible to impose penal sanctions on the 
‘condition.’”86 
Powell, in addition to alleging that the Texas law punished a status, 
argued that alcoholism should be considered a disease much like drug 
addiction in Robinson.87  Powell’s support for this argument was mainly 
testimony by Dr. David Wade, who testified that Powell was a chronic 
alcoholic who, by the time he reached intoxication, would be unable to 
control his actions due to his compulsion to drink.88  However, Dr. Wade also 
admitted that there was no consensus in the medical community as to whether 
alcoholism was a disease or even a consensus on the definition of 
 
 82 Id. at 532. 
 83 Id. at 533. 
 84 Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 550 n.2 (1968) (White, J., concurring). 
 85 Id. 
 86 Id. 
 87 Id. at 517 (“[Powell’s] counsel urged that [Powell] was ‘afflicted with the disease of 
chronic alcoholism’ . . . .”). 
 88 Id. at 517–18. 
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alcoholism.89  On cross-examination, Powell testified that on the day of the 
trial, he had one drink, and when asked why he had only one drink, Powell 
responded that he exercised willpower.90  With this being said, on redirect 
examination, Powell admitted that he only had enough money for one drink, 
suggesting that Powell’s willpower might not have been what ultimately 
deterred him from the second drink.91 
As previously discussed, the Court distinguished the present case from 
Robinson on the basis that Powell was convicted for an action as opposed to 
being convicted due to his status of being an alcoholic.  But the Court did 
discuss whether it would be appropriate to classify alcoholism as a disease 
and the appropriateness of prison sentences for crimes committed by 
alcoholics while drunk.  Focusing on whether alcoholism is a disease, the 
Court discussed the lack of consensus in the medical community as to 
whether alcoholism could properly be classified as a disease and the fact that 
alcoholics can manifest inconsistent symptoms.92  In Powell’s case, the Court 
noted that his first drink was a voluntary exercise of his willpower and that 
Powell did not claim to suffer physical symptoms of withdrawal when 
deprived of alcohol.93  This led the Court to determine that it is inconclusive 
whether alcoholism can properly be classified as a disease.94 
Next, the Court discussed the appropriateness of the criminal process as 
applied to alcoholics.  The Court noted that there did not exist a widely 
accepted rehabilitation method for treating alcoholics, and thus civil 
commitment, as suggested in Robinson for drug addicts, was impractical.95  
The Court also clarified that nothing in the Constitution requires that 
incarceration have a rehabilitative effect.96  Furthermore, Justice Black noted 
in his concurrence that prison might serve a deterrent effect because the threat 
 
 89 See id. (“Dr. Wade sketched the outlines of the ‘disease’ concept of alcoholism; noted 
that there is no generally accepted definition of ‘alcoholism’; alluded to the ongoing debate 
within the medical profession over whether alcohol is actually physically ‘addicting’ or merely 
psychologically ‘habituating’; and concluded that in either case a ‘chronic alcoholic’ is an 
‘involuntary drinker,’ who is ‘powerless not to drink,’ and who ‘loses his self-control over his 
drinking.”) 
 90 Id. at 519. 
 91 Id. at 520. 
 92 Id. at 522–23. 
 93 Id. at 526 (“It is one thing to say that if a man is deprived of alcohol his hands will begin 
to shake, he will suffer agonizing pains and ultimately he will have hallucinations; it is quite 
another to say that a man has a ‘compulsion’ to take a drink, but that he also retains a certain 
amount of ‘free will’ with which to resist.”). 
 94 Id. (noting that psychiatry is undeveloped, the definition of compulsion is inconsistent, 
and importing science and medicine into the law is difficult). 
 95 Id. at 529–30. 
 96 Id. at 530. 
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of incarceration keeps alcoholics from drinking excessively in public.97  The 
Court pointed to the high percentage of alcoholics who conceal their drinking 
problems by not engaging in public drunkenness as potential evidence of this 
deterrence effect.98  In addition, the Court noted that imprisoning an alcoholic 
gives him or her time to sober up and also takes him or her off of the street, 
which increases the overall safety of the public.99  Based on this analysis, the 
Court was unwilling to declare alcoholism a disease.  Thus, the holding of 
the Powell Court was that when a status is sufficiently proximate to a criminal 
act, Robinson does not preclude liability. 
D. CONTRASTING ROBINSON WITH POWELL: PUNISHING A DESIRE 
AS CONTRASTED WITH PUNISHING AN ACTION. 
Contrasting the Robinson court’s holding with the Court’s holding in 
Powell provides a standard by which to evaluate Section 186.22(a).  As 
previously discussed, the Court struck down the California addiction statute 
because it punished a continual status—a compulsion—as opposed to the 
defendant’s actions.  Essentially, the defendant in Robinson did not commit 
a crime in addition to his status as a drug addict, whereas the conviction of 
the alcoholic in Powell was upheld because his status of being an alcoholic 
was linked to the crime of public intoxication.  Therefore, in order for a 
defendant to be criminally liable, the status itself must not be the underlying 
crime, but rather the defendant’s actions must give rise to culpability. 
A practical illustration of the distinction between a culpable action and 
liability based on a status is the California Appellate Court case People v. 
Zapata, which was decided immediately after the Supreme Court’s holding 
in Robinson.  In Zapata, the defendant was charged with the unlawful 
possession of heroin.100  Zapata contested the trial court’s guilty verdict on 
the grounds that it violated Robinson because he possessed the heroin due to 
being a drug addict.101  The Court, upholding the sentence, distinguished the 
present case from Robinson on the grounds that Robinson focused on a status, 
whereas the present case focused on an antisocial act, Zapata’s possession of 
the heroin.102  Likewise, in Powell, had the Texas law imposed culpability 
for Powell’s mere desire to drink, unrelated to Powell being drunk in public, 
it would have run afoul of Robinson.  But instead of punishing a desire, the 
law in Powell punished the antisocial act of being intoxicated while in public.  
 
 97 Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 539 (1968) (Black, J., concurring). 
 98 Id. at 530–31. 
 99 Id. at 538. 
 100 People v. Zapata, 34 Cal. Rptr. 171, 173 (Cal. Ct. App. 1963). 
 101 Id. 
 102 Id. 
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For example, had Zapata received an additional punishment for being an 
addict, as opposed to just being punished for his possession of heroin, the 
Robinson analysis would be applicable.  Because Zapata was only punished 
for his possession of heroin, the Powell doctrine applied instead of Robinson.  
When applied to Section 186.22(a), the distinction between Robinson and 
Powell points to Section 186.22(a) punishing a status as opposed to an 
antisocial action. 
IV. APPLYING ROBINSON AND POWELL TO SECTION 186.22(A) 
A. AS A SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE, SECTION 186.22(A) SHOULD BE 
DEEMED UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
Disregarding the fact that Section 182.22(a) requires an underlying 
felonious offense, penalizing a person for the status of being a gang affiliate 
undoubtedly runs afoul of Robinson.  When examining the California 
addiction statute, the Robinson Court found that the law creating a continuous 
offense lacked the “actus reus” element required for culpability.103  Likewise, 
Section 186.22(a) also creates a continuous offense absent a clear actus reus.  
The California Supreme Court has held on numerous occasions that Section 
186.22(a) does not criminalize gang membership but rather “active 
participation.”104  The basis for this rationale is that the active participation 
and knowledge of a gang’s criminal activity distinguishes Section 186.22(a) 
from a status offense, such as in Robinson.105  But the evidentiary 
requirements to prove the active participation and the requisite knowledge of 
the gang’s criminal activity amount to proving merely that the defendant was 
associated with a gang. 
All that the prosecutor needs to show in order to prove active 
participation is that the defendant’s participation was more than nominal or 
passive.106  In essence, the actus reus of a Section 186.22(a) offense is being 
an active member in a criminal street gang.  However, the California 
 
 103 Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 660 (1962). 
 104 See, e.g., People v. Rodriguez, 290 P.3d 1143, 1149 (Cal. 2012) (“The Legislature thus 
sought to avoid punishing mere gang membership . . . ”); People v. Albillar, 244 P.3d 1062, 
1069–70 (Cal. 2010) (“[T]he Legislature expressly required in section 186.22(a) that a 
defendant not only ‘actively participates’ in a criminal street gang . . . but also that the 
defendant does so with ‘knowledge that [the gang’s] members engage in or have engaged in a 
pattern of criminal gang activity,’ and that the defendant ‘willfully promotes, furthers, or 
assists in any felonious criminal conduct by members of that gang.’ These statutory elements 
necessary to prove a violation of section 186.22(a) exceed the due process requirement of 
personal guilt.”) (citations omitted). 
 105 See generally Albillar, 244 P.3d at 1069–70. 
 106 People v. Castenada, 3 P.3d 278, 280 (Cal. 2000). 
2020] STEPPING INTO THE “WRONG” NEIGHBORHOOD 643 
Supreme Court has not defined what nominal or passive means.107  In the 
absence of a clear definition, common evidence used by prosecutors to prove 
active participation includes the existence of gang tattoos, close association 
with known gang members, and testimony establishing that the defendant is 
in, or is associated, with a gang.108  Allowing close association with gang 
members to constitute conclusive evidence for active participation would 
seem to be the definition of criminalizing gang membership.  It seems 
necessary that gang members, even passive members, would be somewhat 
affiliated with other gang members considering that most gangs are part of a 
local community.  Furthermore, relying on tattoos as evidence of active gang 
membership baselessly presupposes that a passive member would not get a 
tattoo and that a formally active member would have the tattoo removed. 
The current standard of proving gang affiliation is extremely 
problematic.  Absent the underlying crime being gang-related, the 
prosecution asks the jury to essentially see whether a shape fits into a hole—
to apply their stereotype of what an active gang member is to the defendant 
being tried.  Unsurprisingly, convictions based on this type of evidence result 
in a disproportionate number of young minority, urban males being convicted 
of active participation in a criminal street gang.109  In addition, like the drug 
addiction law in Robinson, it is impossible to tell whether a gang member is 
an active member, a passive member, or even a former member based on 
evidence common to anyone affiliated with a gang.  The only concrete way 
to know if a defendant is currently an active gang member or an affiliate is 
for the individual to commit a gang-related crime. 
Furthermore, the requirement that the defendant has knowledge of the 
gang’s criminal activities is insufficient without a corresponding requirement 
that the underlying crime be gang-related, which would serve to prove the 
defendant’s specific intent to further those activities.  The Albillar court 
relied on Scales to uphold Section 186.22(a), noting that the defendants had 
both knowledge of the gang’s criminal activities and specific intent to 
commit a crime.  But the Scales opinion states that the member who “lacks 
the requisite specific intent to bring about the overthrow of the 
 
 107 See Baker, supra note 17, at 108–12. 
 108 Placido G. Gomez, It Is Not So Simply because an Expert Says It Is So: The Reliability 
of Gang Expert Testimony Regarding Membership in Criminal Street Gangs: Pushing the 
Limits of Texas Rule of Evidence, 34 ST. MARY’S L.J. 581, 610 (2003). 
 109 Sara Lynn Van Hofwegen, Unjust and Ineffective: A Critical Look at California’s 
STEP Act, 18 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 679, 683 (2009) (noting that “[i]n the Los Angeles 
County gang database, approximately half of all African American men between the ages of 
sixteen and twenty-four in Los Angeles County are listed as gang members or associates”). 
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government . . . . [is] not by this statute made a criminal.”110  Thus, Scales 
does not support the Albillar court’s assertion that the intent to commit any 
crime satisfies the specific intent requirement.  Rather, Scales affirms that the 
specific intent must be tied to the criminal act; the underlying crime must be 
gang-related.  Likewise, the only way to determine whether a defendant has 
the specific intent to further a gang’s crimes is for the defendant to commit 
or assist in a gang-related crime. 
Consider the following illustrative case.  On April 22, 2010, police 
conducted a search of parolee Mario Antonio Lopez’s apartment.111 Inside a 
dresser, the police found an unloaded handgun.112  Lopez was charged with 
unlawful possession of a firearm and active participation in a criminal street 
gang pursuant to Section 186.22(a).113  At trial, Detective Brian Sinigiani 
testified as an expert witness that Lopez had tattoos consistent with gang 
membership, that Lopez’s family was known for having gang affiliations, 
that Lopez possessed letters addressed to gang members, and that a firearm 
would be a benefit to a gang because firearms are often used to commit gang 
crimes.114  Lopez was convicted on both counts and sentenced to a term of 
nine years.115  On appeal, the Section 186.22(a) conviction was sustained on 
the basis that Sinigiani’s testimony was sufficient for a jury to conclude that 
Lopez was actively involved in a street gang and that possessing the firearm 
was a felony, thus satisfying the elements of Section 186.22(a).116 
This case illustrates the inherent problems of Section 186.22(a) as 
applied to non-gang-related crimes.  The jury was asked to make a 
determination as to whether Lopez was an active participant in a criminal 
street gang not based on any action by Lopez, but based solely on the 
testimony of a police detective.117  Like in Robinson, where two officers 
testified against the defendant as to whether he was a drug addict, it is 
unsurprising that a jury would rule against the defense when the defendant 
was a convicted felon.  Such an application of Section 186.22(a) creates a 
continuous crime for which a person may be prosecuted at any instance 
without the ability to reform.  Like someone accused of being a drug addict, 
a person accused of violating Section 186.22(a) is criminalized based on 
 
 110 Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 229–30 (1961) (internal quotations omitted). 
 111 People v. Lopez, No. A133997, 2013 WL 4784760, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 9, 2013). 
 112 Id. 
 113 Id. 
 114 Id. at *3. 
 115 Id. at *1. 
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 117 Lopez’s sister also testified that Lopez did not own the gun. However, the testimony 
was not discussed in-depth on appeal.  
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affiliation—a status, rather than an act.  The law does not purport to punish 
a person for committing gang crimes or for acting in concert with a gang, but 
rather punishes the mere association with gang members.118 
It is worth noting that there is a dissimilarity between the Robinson law 
and Section 186.22(a).  While an addict was subject to prosecution at any 
time, Section 186.22(a) requires that a felonious crime be committed for 
prosecution to occur.  An argument could be made that the requirement of an 
underlying crime serves as an actus reus and thus shields Section 186.22(a) 
from the Robinson Court’s rationale.  But as previously noted, Section 
186.22(a) is a substantive offense and thus the underlying crime is 
extraneous.119  If the addiction law had required an unrelated underlying 
felonious crime, the Robinson analysis would remain the same because the 
status of drug addiction would still be criminalized.  Therefore, the 
requirement that an underlying felony be committed does not shield Section 
186.22(a) from the Robinson rationale. 
B. IF CLASSIFIED AS AN ENHANCEMENT OFFENCE, SECTION 
186.22(A) SHOULD BE DEEMED UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
Since Section 186.22(a) requires an underlying felony, it could be 
argued that Section 186.22(a) is not in fact a substantive offense, but rather 
an enhancement offense.  The observation that Section 186.22(a) might not 
be properly classified as a substantive offense would seem to be supported 
by the fact that Section 186.22(a) is dependent on an underlying felonious 
crime and, absent the felonious crime, Section 186.22(a) would be 
inapplicable.  The significance of this argument is that Robinson did not 
examine punishing a status tied to an unrelated act.  For example, consider 
replacing the gang language of Section 186.22(a) with addiction to read: any 
person who is addicted to narcotics with knowledge that narcotics are 
criminal, and who willfully promotes, furthers, or assists in any felonious 
criminal conduct by narcotics addicts, shall be punished.120  Such a statute 
 
 118 The Robinson Court likewise noted that the California addiction statute “is not one 
which punishes a person for the use of narcotics, for their purchase, sale or possession, or for 
antisocial or disorderly behavior resulting from their administration . . . . [r]ather, we deal with 
a statute which makes the ‘status’ of narcotic addiction a criminal offense.” Robinson v. 
California, 370 U.S. 660, 666. (1962). 
 119 See supra Section I.B (discussing the difference between a substantive and an 
enhancement offense). 
 120 See CAL PENAL CODE § 186.22(a) (West 2018) (“Any person who actively participates 
in any criminal street gang with knowledge that its members engage in, or have engaged in, a 
pattern of criminal gang activity, and who willfully promotes, furthers, or assists in any 
felonious criminal conduct by members of that gang, shall be punished by imprisonment in a 
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would seem to make Robinson inapplicable because liability would be based 
on both a status and action, as opposed to just a status even though the action 
might be unrelated to the status.  But even when coupled with an action, an 
offense unrelated to the status would still likely fail constitutional muster 
based on the analysis in the proceeding paragraphs. 
While the United States Supreme Court has never examined drug 
addiction or gang enhancements tied to unrelated felonies, there are several 
Supreme Court cases examining the application of hate crime enhancements 
in such contexts.  While the definition of what constitutes a hate crime may 
vary by state, hate crime enhancements, in general, are “heightened penalties 
when certain crimes, independently punishable under other penal code 
sections, are committed because of the victim’s race, color, religion, 
ethnicity, or other such characteristic.”121  Hate crimes can appropriately be 
analogized to narcotics use by an addict in the sense that the status of hating 
another racial group does not trigger a sentence enhancement, but rather the 
commission of the hateful acts towards that group triggers the sentence 
enhancement.122  The question of whether hate crime enhancements could 
constitutionally be applied to non-hate crimes was discussed by the Supreme 
Court in Wisconsin v. Mitchell. 
In Wisconsin v. Mitchell, the Supreme Court, affirming Mitchell’s 
conviction of race-based aggravated battery, analyzed when enhancements 
for hate crimes were appropriately assessed on an underlying crime by 
contrasting two cases: Dawson v. Delaware and Barclay v. Florida.123  In 
Dawson, the defendant was convicted of first-degree murder.124  During the 
sentencing phase of the trial, the prosecution introduced evidence that 
Dawson was a member of the Aryan Brotherhood, a violent white nationalist 
gang, but the prosecutor failed to link Dawson’s crime to his membership in 
the Aryan Brotherhood.125  Vacating the judgment, the Supreme Court noted 
that had the prosecutor linked Dawson’s membership in the Aryan 
Brotherhood to his crimes, then his membership in the Aryan Brotherhood 
would have been relevant to his sentencing.126  Because Dawson’s 
membership was unrelated to his crimes, the Court held that Dawson’s 
 
county jail for a period not to exceed one year, or by imprisonment in the state prison for 16 
months, or two or three years.”). 
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sentence violated the First Amendment as “the evidence proved nothing more 
than Dawson’s abstract beliefs.”127 
The Mitchell Court then compared the holding in Dawson with the 
holding in Barclay v. Florida.128  In Barclay, the defendant was a member of 
the Black Liberation Army who, along with other members, killed a random 
white man with the goal of starting a revolution and racial war.129  In 
affirming Barclay’s death sentence, the Supreme Court, in a plurality 
opinion, held that Barclay’s racial hatred was relevant as an aggravating 
factor because Barclay’s hatred led him to commit the murder.130  Despite 
both Dawson and Barclay dealing with the sentencing phase as opposed to a 
hate crime enhancement, the Mitchell Court concluded that the rationale in 
both were relevant as “death, [is] surely the most severe ‘enhancement.’”131  
The Mitchell Court noted that the purpose of an enhancement is to punish 
“conduct [that] is thought to inflict greater individual and societal harm.”132  
Thus, applying both cases, the Mitchell Court concluded that bias is relevant 
only when an enhancement seeks to penalize bias-inspired conduct on the 
grounds that different crimes—those motivated by bias as opposed to 
unbiased crimes—133 should have different severities of punishment.134 
The application of Section 186.22(a) as an enhancement offense where 
the underlying crime is non-gang-related is akin to the testimony that Dawson 
was a white supremacist and likewise, is irrelevant when not connected to the 
underlying crime.  If the goal of an enhancement penalty is to punish crimes 
of different severity with different sentences, then it does not make sense to 
punish crimes of the same magnitude differently.  The application of Section 
186.22(a) to non-gang-related crimes ultimately punishes the defendant for 
his or her membership, which is akin to punishing the defendant for his or 
 
 127 Id. at 167. 
 128 Wisconsin, 508 U.S. at 486. 
 129 Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 942 (1983). 
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 132 Id. at 487–88. 
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648 DIPIETRO [Vol. 110 
her abstract beliefs.  This is evidenced by the fact that just because a felonious 
crime was committed by a gang member does not make it anymore heinous 
than if the felonious crime was committed by a non-gang member, when gang 
membership is irrelevant to the felonious crime.  Therefore, even if Section 
186.22(a) was deemed an enhancement offense, as opposed to its current 
classification as a substantive offense, it would likely fail constitutional 
muster per Dawson. 
V. GANG AFFILIATION SHOULD BE TREATED THROUGH 
REHABILITATION RATHER THAN THROUGH 
CRIMINALIZATION AND IMPRISONMENT 
The remainder of this Comment will argue that, as a matter of public 
policy, gang membership should be treated similarly to the modern-day 
treatment of drug addicts as opposed to punished by way of imprisonment.  
The basis for this argument is the underlying policy reasons emphasized in 
the Robinson Court’s second holding, that it would be a cruel and unusual 
punishment to punish a person for having a disease.135  Instead of focusing 
solely on Section 186.22(a), this argument expands to include gang 
enhancements in general, which would include Section 186.22(b).  
Admittedly, considering the Court’s decision in Powell, the argument that 
gang membership should be considered a disease is a difficult argument to 
make.  But as discussed in the following subsections, in many ways, gang 
membership parallels drug addiction, perhaps even more closely than 
alcoholism parallels drug addiction, and thus the Robinson rationale should 
extend to gang membership. 
A. WHY PUNISHING ADDICTION AMOUNTS TO A CRUEL AND 
UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT 
Prior to comparing addiction to gang affiliation, it is paramount to 
understand the policy reasons behind the Robinson Court’s decision that 
punishing an addict is akin to punishing a person for having a disease.  While 
there is not a clear definition of what constitutes a disease, the Robinson 
Court’s decision does classify drug addiction as a disease.  According to 
DiClemente’s Addiction and Change, the essential elements of an addiction 
are: 
(1) the development of a solidly established, problematic pattern of an appetitive—that 
is, pleasurable and reinforcing—behavior; (2) the presence of physiological and 
psychological components of the behavior pattern that create dependence; and (3) the 
 
 135 See supra Section III.B (discussing the Robinson case). 
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interaction of these components in the individual’s life that make the behavior very 
important and resistant to change.136 
In the case of drug addiction, these elements are oftentimes readably 
observable.137 Common environmental factors that contribute to the 
development of an individual’s addiction to drugs include: “poverty, limited 
material conditions, disorganized families . . . [and] group affiliation to drug 
users.”138  These environmental factors are then coupled with the early age 
of drug users; the most common age being between eighteen and twenty-
five.139  The culmination of these factors leads to an appetite for drugs as a 
means of escaping a less than desirable social condition.140 
While the environmental factors create the desire for drug use, the 
physiological and psychological components of drug addiction create a 
dependence on drugs.  This dependence can be described as a necessity to 
use drugs to maintain normal physiological symptoms.141  For example, users 
of methamphetamine (meth) experience a euphoric state of invulnerability 
which users describe as “a vacation from loneliness and sorrow.”142  In 
addition to the psychological effects of meth, the physiological effects of 
meth further cause dependence.  Meth causes the brain to release large 
quantities of dopamine which results in an intense pleasurable high.143  Once 
dopamine levels return to normal the only way for the user to regain their 
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high is to take more meth, thus creating the physiological dependence.144  The 
culmination of these factors makes it difficult, if not impossible, for a drug 
addict to stop using drugs absent treatment. 
Applying the purposes of criminal law, it is this difficulty in quitting 
that makes the imprisonment of addicts a form of cruel and unusual 
punishment.145  As the Robinson Court noted, “[e]ven one day in prison 
would be a cruel and unusual punishment for the ‘crime’ of having a common 
cold.”146  Punishing a drug addict for being a drug addict does not deter the 
individual from using drugs in the future because punishment fails to address 
the underlying cause of addiction—the addict’s physical and psychological 
dependence on the drug.  The ineffectiveness of imprisonment is evidenced 
by the fact that an estimated 95% of convicted drug users return to substance 
abuse once released from imprisonment.147 
Therefore, instead of imprisonment, the modern-day focus is treating 
drug addicts through rehabilitation programs.148  While drug addicts are still 
charged for committing crimes, their addiction is not considered a crime but 
instead a treatable disease.  As a result of this change in focus, rehabilitation 
program participants have been found to be up to 67% less likely to 
recidivate.149  The next section will contrast the archetypical gang member 
with the archetypical drug addict and argue that mandatory rehabilitation, as 
opposed to incarceration, should be advocated rather than criminalization as 
imposed by Section 186.22.150 
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B. THE POLICY RATIONALE FOR TREATING RATHER THAN 
IMPRISONING DRUG ADDICTS ALSO APPLIES TO GANG 
AFFILIATES 
The archetypal gang affiliate parallels that of a drug addict.  The average 
gang member comes from a family with low socioeconomic status, living in 
a neighborhood with high existing gang membership.151  Often, the 
archetypal gang affiliate has a family history of gang membership and 
criminality that indoctrinates family members in the gang lifestyle from a 
young age.152  While it is unclear what the average age of a gang member is, 
several studies have concluded that gang membership peaks around the ages 
of fourteen and fifteen.153 
As previously discussed, addicts often use drugs to fulfill a need, such 
as a means of escaping a less than desirable social condition.154  Likewise, 
gang affiliation provides a means for affiliates to seemingly escape their less 
than ideal social conditions.  In one respect, gang affiliation provides physical 
support to affiliates.155  Gangs are most prevalent in neighborhoods with the 
highest rates of violence.156  Gangs serve a protection function for affiliates. 
Furthermore, those who live in these impoverished communities and 
refuse to join a neighborhood gang risk physical retaliation by the gang 
against them and their family.157  Community members in such 
neighborhoods often have a strong distrust towards law enforcement based 
on historical mistreatment.158  Furthermore, gangs are known to enforce strict 
“no-snitch rules” that punish and sometimes even kill community members 
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who look for support outside of the gang.159  Thus, like a drug addict, a gang 
affiliate’s environment has a significant impact on the gang affiliate joining 
and remaining in a gang. 
Once a person becomes affiliated with a gang it is extremely difficult to 
end that affiliation due to the possibility of physical harm and psychological 
dependence.  The risk of physical harm in leaving a gang mirrors the physical 
addiction of drug users.  Take for example the story of Keith Smith, a fifteen-
year-old who was beaten into a coma for attempting to leave his gang.160  
This situation is not uncommon as gangs frequently enforce a “blood in, 
blood out” policy whereby members who attempt to leave risk severe 
beatings or even being killed.161  Like an addict who takes drugs to achieve 
a desired physical state, a gang affiliate must remain affiliated with a gang to 
maintain his or her physical state. 
Furthermore, the physical need for gang affiliation is accompanied by 
an even greater psychological dependence.  As previously discussed, people 
affiliate with gangs to fulfill a need.  This is often the need to cope with a less 
than ideal socioeconomic condition.162  Gangs use this fulfillment to bond 
with their community and provide their members with protection and a means 
of identity.  In some cases, gang membership has existed in communities for 
generations.163  For gang affiliates to cease being affiliated with their gang 
would thus require them to separate from their community and perhaps even 
their family.  This requirement is shown in several studies, which concluded 
that ex-gang members who remain in contact with gang members, such as by 
living in the same community, experience higher rates of victimization by 
the gang.164  In conjunction with the economic infeasibility of leaving their 
community, gang affiliates might reasonably believe their only option is to 
remain affiliated with their gang. 
Thus, in many ways, the reasons for why a person joins and remains in 
a gang parallels why a drug addict remains addicted to drugs.  The 
development of both drug addiction and gang affiliation stems from a 
problematic underlying condition and is difficult to change due to 
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physiological and psychological dependencies.  The Robinson Court noted 
that the criminalization of drug addiction did not attempt to cure the 
underlying problem but merely served to punish.165  Likewise, California’s 
punishment of gang members through imprisonment does not cure 
California’s gang problem but has rather exasperated it.  When Section 
186.22(a) was enacted, the number of gangs in California was estimated to 
be nearly 600.166  That number has increased to over 6,442 since the 
enactment of Section 186.22(a)—an increase of roughly 973%.167  While 
California is undoubtedly sending more gang members to prison, prisons 
have been described as a “breeding ground” for gang membership, and in 
some areas, the number of gang members in prison has climbed by over 32% 
in the last decade alone.168  Numerous studies have concluded that prison is 
ineffective at treating the gang problem.  In one study, gang affiliates were 
shown to be six percentage points more likely to return to prison than 
prisoners without gang affiliation.169  In another study, 83.2% of gang 
members returned to prison within three years compared to only 44.8% of 
non-gang members.170  These statistics highlight that the criminalization 
process, specifically imprisonment, is ineffective at preventing and deterring 
gang membership. 
Instead of criminalization, California should spend its resources on the 
intervention and rehabilitation of gang members.  Programs aimed at 
rehabilitating gang members and preventing gang membership in the first 
place like the California Gang Reduction, Intervention and Prevention 
(CalGRIP) program, have shown to drastically decrease gang member 
recidivism.171  Likewise, the switch from criminalizing drug addicts to 
treating them has drastically reduced their recidivism rate.172  Thus, treating 
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gang members would likely result in a drastic decrease in their recidivism 
rate considering how the underlying factors of gang affiliation mirror the 
underlying factors of drug addiction.  In addition to reducing recidivism, 
studies have shown the cost of gang rehabilitation programs is significantly 
lower than the cost of incarcerating gang affiliates.173 
CONCLUSION 
The purposes of criminal law are to deter, punish, and rehabilitate.174  
Section 186.22(a) accomplishes none of these objectives.  A gang affiliate is 
not deterred from gang affiliation by a system that does nothing to cure the 
underlying causes of gang affiliation because gang affiliation, like a disease, 
cannot be cured by a prison sentence.  While proponents of the STEP Act 
cite the difficulty of convicting gang affiliates for their crimes as a 
justification for Section 186.22(a), such an argument does not validate a law 
which punishes mere gang affiliation.175  Furthermore, when gang affiliates 
commit crimes, they are still subject to the sentences that their crimes carry.  
Incarcerating a gang member in hopes of deterring the gang member from 
remaining in the gang is akin to exposing someone with a disease to other 
people who have that disease and hoping that the increased exposure will 
cure the disease.  Until the cause of gang affiliation is properly treated, more 
people will continue to receive additional sentences for a crime akin to 
having a cold. 
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